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"[T]hey are . . .promulgated established laws, not to be varied in
particularcases, but to have one rule ...for thefavourite at Court, and

the countryman atplough."
John Locke2
I. INTRODUCTION

In the early morning hours of April 23, 1987, twenty-eight-year-old
Clyde Timothy Bunkley made an error in judgment for which he may
spend the rest of his life behind bars. He did not murder an innocent
victim. In fact, he did not so much as lay a hand upon another person. His
crime was not of that egregious nature for which the only proper
punishment is a complete deprivation of freedom. Instead, he broke into
an unoccupied Western Sizzlin' restaurant at four o'clock in the morning
while carrying an accessory he had always carried: his small pocketknife.'
For this crime, he has been sentenced to life in prison without parole.'
At about the same time that a Florida appellate court affirmed
Bunkley's life sentence, 6 a young Salvadore Arroyo entered an apartment
with an open pocketknife in his hand.7 He was confronted by the
apartment's tenants and arrested soon afterwards.' A jury convicted him
of attempted armed burglary.9 The appellate court, however, reversed,
finding that without evidence that the knife was used in a way likely to
cause death or injury, Arroyo could be convicted of only attempted
burglary. "0

One man gets life without parole" while the other receives a five-year
sentence.' 2 The disparity was not due to the whims of two different juries
or to aggravating circumstances that made one crime more heinous than

trans., Penguin Books 1992) (circa 350 B.C.).
2. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. XI, para. 142, at 79
(Prometheus Books 1986) (1690).
3. Clyde Timothy Bunkley currently sits in Polk County Correctional Facility. Interview
with Clyde Timothy Bunkley, Inmate No. 051390 at Polk Correctional Facility, Polk City, Fla.
(Oct. 31, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Clyde Timothy Bunkley]. His
petition for writ of certiorari was filed on December 24, 2004 and denied on January 10, 2005. Id.;
Bunkley v. Florida, 125 S.Ct. 939 (2005).
4. Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 836 (2003).
5. Id. at 837.
6. The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court's decision in 1989. Id.
7. Arroyo v. State, 564 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1154-55.
11. Bunkley v. State, 882 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 2004).
12. Compare FLA. STAT. § 810.02(4)(a) (2004), with FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (2004).
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the other. Rather, the disparity resulted because an ambiguity in the law
allowed the Arroyo court to properly require evidence of the defendant's
use of the pocketknife, while the Bunkley court failed to do so. 3 Not based
upon this evidence of use, Bunkley's life sentence for burglarizing an
unoccupied restaurant while carrying a small pocketknife is not only
contrary to Florida law, but it also results in a punishment that is
disproportionate to the crime.' 4
Ten years later, the Florida Supreme Court had the opportunity to
remedy this excessive punishment by retroactively applying the 1997
decision ofL.B. v. State.'5 Relying upon a 1951 Attorney General Opinion,
the L.B. court had defined a common pocketknife as any knife possessing
a blade of four inches or less in length.' 6 Instead of seizing this chance to
properly apply the law to Bunkley's case, the Florida Supreme Court
characterized the 1997 decision as an "evolutionary refinement," refused
to apply it retroactively, and upheld Bunkley's sentence for life in prison
without the chance for parole.' 7
Bunkley's case offers insight into two competing principles that
underlie the American justice system. As Aristotle long ago articulated,
laws should not be stagnant but flexible-capable of evolving over time
or adapting to the peculiar circumstances that arise in individual cases.' 8
Locke, however, later modified this principle by stating that laws should
be applied with a certain level of consistency.' 9 Because the American
legal system is premised on both notions, a delicate balance necessarily
arises: laws must adjust to circumstances within each individual case, but
defendants charged with the same crime should be adjudicated under the
same principles of law.
These competing values of flexibility and consistency are especially
difficult to balance in the areas of retroactivity and post-conviction relief.
When we factor in due process issues, this balance becomes even more
difficult to maintain. Unfortunately for post-conviction appellants like
Clyde Timothy Bunkley, the Florida Supreme Court narrowly limits the
purpose of post-conviction relief to the retroactivity analysis without
focusing on the due process implications that may arise."0 Under this
13. See Arroyo, 564 So. 2d at 1154-55. The Arroyo court's reversal of the trial court's
decision relied exclusively on the absence of evidence of use. Id.
14. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
15. 700 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1997).
16. Id. at 373.
17. Bunkleyv. State, 833 So. 2d 739, 740 (Fla. 2002), vacated,Bunkleyv. Florida, 538 U.S.
835 (2003).
18. ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 138.

19. LOCKE, supra note 2, at 79.
20. See Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 927 (Fla. 1980) (holding that the main goal of postconviction relief in Florida is to determine whether a change in the law will be applied
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limited analysis, the Florida Supreme Court distinguishes between
"jurisprudential upheavals," which are major changes in the law that are
applied retroactively, and "evolutionary refinements," which are minor
changes that do not receive retroactive treatment.2 '
In this Note, I explore Florida's standards for post-conviction relief. I
argue that the current approach, by narrowly construing the purpose of
post-conviction relief to a determination of whether a change in the law
should be applied retroactively, 2 fails to adequately protect an individual's
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. In Part II of this Note, I
discuss the development of Florida's post-conviction standards and argue
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fiore v. "hite3 has
augmented a defendant's ability to obtain post-conviction relief-an
increase in individual protection that the Florida Supreme Court is
reluctant to recognize. In Part II, I provide a case study analysis of
Bunkley v. State2 4 to demonstrate the deterioration of due process rights
caused by the Florida Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of postconviction relief. The Note concludes with some possible solutions to the
arbitrariness that results from the Florida Supreme Court's restrictive
approach. These remedies may help protect due process rights and
promote equal justice, so that one man's pocketknife is not another man's
dangerous weapon, and one man's acquittal is not another man's life
sentence.
1I.

RETROACTIVITY UNDER FLORIDA LAW

Where there is no fundamental constitutional right at stake, state courts
may adopt their own criminal retroactivity standards.25 Under Florida's

retroactively).
21. Id. at 929.
22. See supra note 20.
23. 531 U.S. 225 (2001).
24. 882 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2004).
25. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 928. The Florida Supreme Court noted in Witt that "we are not
obligated to construe our rule concerning post-conviction relief in the same manner as its federal
counterpart, at least where fundamental federal constitutional rights are not involved." Id. The court
proceeded to state that "the concept of federalism clearly dictates that we retain the authority to
determine which 'changes of law' will be cognizable under this state's post-conviction relief
machinery." Id.(footnote omitted); see Clem v. State, 81 P.3d 521 (Nev. 2003). In Clem, the court
held that
a state's highest court may, by its first interpretation of a criminal statute's
provisions, eitherchange or clarify the law. It follows that where a state's highest
court departs from its own previous interpretation of a statute, the new decision
may also constitute either a change or a clarification of the law even though the
statutory language was not. changed.
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retroactivity approach, the Florida Supreme Court classifies a decision
handed down after a prisoner's conviction becomes final as either a
jurisprudential upheaval or an evolutionary refinement.26 Because only the
former applies retroactively, this initial classification determines whether
the later decision can be applied retroactively to a post-conviction
appellant's case.
A. Witt v. State: The Origin of Florida's Post-ConvictionRelief
Standards

In Witt v. State,27 the Florida Supreme Court clarified the applicable
standard when a prisoner seeks to have a post-conviction ruling applied
retroactively. 28 Witt, a prisoner convicted of first-degree murder, sought
post-conviction relief on the grounds that subsequent favorable
developments in capital murder cases should be retroactively applied to his
case. 29 Rejecting all of Witt's contentions, the Florida Supreme Court held
that three of the new rules he wanted retroactively applied were mere
"evolutionary refinements" that operate only prospectively.3"

Id. at 529; see also Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact ofTeague v. Lane on
State Postconviction Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 424 (1993) (noting that states are free "to
develop an approach to retroactivity which enables them to fulfill the requirements of their state
constitutions, statutes, and case law"). Hutton then lists state courts that have developed their own
approach, as well as others that have commented on their right to do so. Id at 424 n. 18.
26. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929.
27. 387 So. 2d 922.
28. Id. at 929-30. The court stated that it was "confronted with a threshold decision as to
when a change of decisional law mandates a reversal of a once valid conviction and sentence of
death." Id. at 924.
29. Id. Witt claimed that six rules should be applied retroactively. Id. The first rule dealt with
the significance of improper aggravating circumstances where at least one mitigating circumstance
was found to exist. Id. (citing Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977)). Second, Witt alleged
that a rule concerning the requirements for a written enumeration of the findings in aggravation and
mitigation should apply retroactively. Id. (citing Hall v. State, 381 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1979)). Third,
he argued for the retroactive application of a rule concerning the definitions for mitigating
circumstances. Id. (citing Shue v. State, 366 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1978) and Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d
831 (Fla. 1977)). Fourth, he argued for the retroactive application of a rule that made nonMirandized statements given during a court-ordered psychiatric examination inadmissible in a
sentencing proceeding. Id. (citing Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979)). Fifth, he sought
retroactive application of a rule that required the State, before imposing the death penalty, to
establish that the defendant intended to kill the victim. Id. (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978)). Finally, he argued that a rule relating to the efficacy of a defendant's waiver of his right
to counsel should be applied retroactively. Id. (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)).
30. Id. at 930; see Hutton, supra note 25, at 430-31 (discussing the interest in finality and
concluding that "[tihe interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose ... may quite
legitimately... outweigh in... most instances the competing interest in readjudicating convictions
according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas petition is filed") (first two omissions in

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

5

Florida Law Review,
Vol.
57, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 3
FLORIDA
LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 57

The Florida Supreme Court's opinion drew a distinction between two
types of changes in the law: evolutionary refinements and jurisprudential
upheavals.31 According to the majority, the doctrine of finality requires
that onlyjurisprudential upheavals be applied retroactively.32 Only "a more
compelling objective," such as fairness or uniformity in individual cases,
should outweigh the doctrine of finality. 33 This limited classification
exercise encompasses what the Florida Supreme Court perceives as the
main purpose of post-conviction relief: to determine whether a decision is
a jurisprudential upheaval that must be applied retroactively.34
Expounding on the definition of jurisprudential upheaval, the Florida
Supreme Court noted that these major changes in the law are likely to fall
within two categories.35 The first are "changes of law which place beyond
the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose
certain penalties."36 The case best exemplifying this first category is Coker
v.Georgia.37 Coker was sentenced to death under a Georgia law that made
rape a capital offense.38 In reversing the Georgia Supreme Court and
striking down the statute, the United States Supreme Court held that
Coker's punishment was grossly disproportionate to his crime and
constituted excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 39 Because

original) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in the judgment)).
31. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929.
32. Id. at 929-30.
33. Id.at 925. Although the Florida Supreme Court cites uniformity in individual cases as
ajustification that may outweigh finality, the Florida Supreme Court seems unwilling to apply this
rationale in its jurisprudence. Theoretically, this uniformity would require the retroactive
application of later decisions that altered previous judicial interpretations. To reach uniformity in
individual cases, courts would need to give retroactive relief to post-conviction appellants who
received an unfavorable interpretation of the law. However, given the Florida Supreme Court's
tendency to interpret post-conviction decisions as evolutionary refinements, uniformity rarely
outweighs the finality interest cited by the court.
34. Id. at 927 (holding that the main goal of post-conviction relief is to determine if changes
1990)
in the law should be applied retroactively). Cf People v. Flowers, 561 N.E.2d 674, 682 (I11.
(finding that the main purpose of post-conviction action "is to ensure that defendant's [sic] are not
denied constitutional protections").
35. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)); see State v. Glenn, 558 So. 2d 4, 6
(Fla. 1990) (citing Coker as an example of the first category of jurisprudential upheaval).
38. Coker, 433 U.S. at 586.
at 597-98,600. For a further discussion of the Eighth Amendment and proportionality
39. Id.
doctrine, see Blake J. Delaney, Case Comment, A Cruel and Unusual Application of the
ProportionalityPrinciple in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 56 FLA. L. REV. 459, 460 (2004)
(describing two competing interpretations of the Eighth Amendment, with one focusing on the
modes ofpunishment, and the other emphasizing the "proportionality between the harshness of the
penalty and the gravity of the offense").

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss3/3

6

Smith: Post-Conviction
Relief Under
Florida
Process of th
FLORIDA LAUndue
W
RELIEF
UNDERLaws:The
POST-CONVICTION

659

the United States Supreme Court's decision was a major constitutional
change that proscribed the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
rape, it was classified as a jurisprudential upheaval and therefore subject
to retroactive application.4"
The second category ofjurisprudential upheavals concerns those cases
that attain a magnitude of a certain threshold, thereby necessitating their
retroactive application.4 In determining whether a change is of a sufficient
magnitude, courts apply a three-pronged test first articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Stovall v. Denno.42 First, courts consider "the
purpose to be served by the new standards."43 Next, courts focus on "the
extent of reliance" on the old rule.' Finally, courts must assess the
resulting "effect on the administration of justice" due to a retroactive
application of the new rule.45 If a new rule greatly "enhances the truthfinding process," it generally is applied retroactively.46 Where, however,
the new rule has a procedural focus, the reliance and administration of
justice factors control, and the rule operates only prospectively.47
In contrast to jurisprudential upheavals, evolutionary refinements are
minor changes in the law that never apply retroactively. 48 These types of
changes may afford new or different guidelines for the admissibility of
evidence or procedural fairness.49 Generally, the Florida Supreme Court
utilizes a very broad definition of evolutionary refinement, allowing the

40. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 928-29. As explored in Part III of this Note, one must consider
whether the Florida Supreme Court's L.B. decision proscribed the penalty of life imprisonment for
the crime of burglarizing an unoccupied business while in possession of a pocketknife with a blade
four inches or less. Arguably, just as the United States Supreme Court proscribed the death penalty
for the crime of rape, the Florida Supreme Court proscribed the penalty of life imprisonment "for
the crime of burglarizing" a premises with a common pocketknife with a blade under four inches.
See infra text accompanying notes 215-17.
41. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929.
42. 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. There is an underlying sense of irony in weighing the resulting effect on the
administration of justice. Apparently, if the court finds that retroactive application will result in
numerous convicted prisoners being released or being entitled to a review of their case, the
administration of justice is heavily burdened, thus weighing against retroactive application. If,
however, numerous prisoners would be exonerated by the recent interpretation, keeping them in
jail by denying retroactive application greatly increases the administration of injustice, not justice.
46. Hutton, supra note 25, at 452.
47. See id. (recognizing the Linkletter-Stovall test's ability to allow courts "to announce
major innovations in criminal procedure rules, but to mute public outcry by limiting the decision
to the litigant before the court and to litigants . . .after the date of the decision") (footnotes
omitted). The drawback to the Linkletter-Stovall test is that it may allow constitutional violations
criticized by the court to serve as the basis for a conviction. Id.
48. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929.
49. Id.
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court great flexibility in determining whether decisions are too
insignificant to be applied retroactively.5"
For example, in State v. Woodley,5" the Florida Supreme Court
characterized as an evolutionary refinement a decision that abolished the
crime of attempted felony murder. 2 Woodley was convicted for attempted
first-degree felony murder. 3 After his conviction became final,54 the
Florida Supreme Court decided State v. Gray,55 which held that the crime
of attempted felony murder no longer was recognizable under Florida
law. 56 As a result, Woodley sought post-conviction relief, asking to have
Gray applied retroactively. 7 The Florida Supreme Court rejected
Woodley's petition, holding that Gray and its new 5rule
abolishing
8
retroactively.
operate
not
would
murder
felony
attempted
It is difficult to distinguish Coker from Gray. Both cases proscribed the
state from imposing certain punishments on individuals. Just as Georgia
no longer could execute persons for the crime of rape,59 Florida could not
punish individuals for attempted felony murder.6" The Florida Supreme
Court, however, cites to Coker as an example of a major constitutional
change, or a jurisprudential upheaval, while Gray is classified as a mere
evolutionary refinement.6' This discrepancy may reflect the Florida
Supreme Court's reluctance to apply later decisions retroactively. Perhaps
if Gray had been heard by the Coker Court, there may have been a finding
of ajurisprudential upheaval, requiring that Graybe applied retroactively.
In support of the nonretroactive treatment of evolutionary refinements
like Gray, the Florida Supreme Court has articulated three main
justifications.62 First, there is a need for finality ofjudgments.63 Otherwise,

50. See Bunkley v. State, 833 So. 2d 739, 744 n. 11 (Fla. 2002) (listing a wide range of
decisions in which the court found the new rule to be an "evolutionary refinement"), vacated,
Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835 (2003).
51. 695 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1997).
52. See id. at 298.
53. Woodley v. State, 673 So. 2d 127, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
54. Woodley v. State, 638 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
55. 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995).
56. Id. at 554.
57. Woodley, 695 So. 2d at 298.
58. Id. In Gray, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that penalties for activities that previously
amounted to attempted felony murder no longer could be imposed on defendants. Gray, 654 So.
2d at 554. This decision arguably qualifies as a jurisprudential upheaval. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
59. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977).
60. Gray, 654 So. 2d at 554.
61. Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 929-30 (Fla. 1980); Woodley, 695 So. 2d at 298.
62. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 928-30.
63. Id. at 929. According to the Florida Supreme Court, "finality will be illusory" if the
convicted person may relitigate the case based on changes in the law. Id. at 926. Arguably, though,
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according to the Florida Supreme Court, the stability of the law would
break down.6' Second, the court has identified the need to render
punishments certain and effective to maintain the criminal law's deterrent
effect.65 Finally, the court has claimed that allowing evolutionary
refinements to be applied retroactively would "burden the judicial
machinery of our state, fiscally and intellectually, beyond any tolerable
limit.'"66 As discussed in Part Il of this Note, one must question whether
tradeoff of not
the injustice of a wrongful imprisonment is worth
67 the
state.,
[the]
of
machinery
burdening the "judicial
B. Fiore v. White: The RelationshipBetween Due Process and
Retroactivity
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fiore v. White68
clarified the relationship, or lack thereof, between the federal Due Process
Clause and the retroactive application of state criminal statutes. In Fiore,
the State of Pennsylvania alleged that Fiore had deviated from the terms
of his hazardous waste facility permit. 69 The lower court convicted Fiore
of operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit.7" After Fiore's
conviction became final, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of Fiore's co-defendant, Scarpone, on grounds that the statute
meant what it said: to operate a hazardous waste facility without a permit
violated the statute, but to merely deviate from the permit's terms was not
illegal.71
Fiore, unsuccessful in his attempts to have his conviction set aside in
state court, brought a federal habeas action.72 The district court granted his

a convicted person is not relitigating a case based on changes in the law, but rather, is asserting that
the court applied the wrong legal standard-a standard not known until the state's highest court was
given an opportunity to interpret the statute.
64. Id.; see id. at 928 (stating that "[t]o allow non-constitutional claims as bases for postconviction relief is to permit a dual system of trial and appeal, the first being tentative and
nonconclusive").
65. Id. at 929.
66. Id. at 929-30; see id. at 928 (speculating that Florida's justice system "could not
accommodate such an expansion").
67. Id. at 929-30. See generally infra Part III (discussing the arbitrary classification of an
evolutionary refinement and the roadblock to post-conviction relief that such a classification
provides).
68. 531 U.S. 225 (2001).
69. Id. at 227.
70. Id. at 226.
71. Id. at 227. The parties did not dispute that Fiore had a permit. Id. According to the State,
though, Fiore had deviated so far from the permit's terms that he had violated the statute. Id.
72. Id.
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request. 73 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed, finding that the Scarpone court had announced a "new
rule of law"74 and that the ruling was inapplicable to Fiore's already final
conviction.75 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court certified to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question of whether Scarpone
represented a clarification of or a change in the law. 76 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found that Scarpone did not articulate a new rule of law,
but merely clarified the plain language of the statute. 7 Thus, the state
court's interpretation in Scarponeprovided the proper statement of the law
at the time Fiore's conviction became final.78
Absent a change in the law, cases like Fiore do not revolve around
retroactivity issues.79 Instead, the proper focus usually is on the federal
Due Process Clause. ° One protection under this clause is that a State is
barred from convicting a person of a crime without proving beyond a
reasonable doubt all the elements of that crime.8 ' For example, where a
State convicts a defendant of operating a hazardous waste facility without
a permit, yet that defendant's possession of a permit is undisputed, the
conviction violates the Due Process Clause. 2 Because the Pennsylvania

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 228. Specifically, the Supreme Court certified the following question: "Does the
interpretation of Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993), set forth in Commonwealth
v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 279, 634 A.2d 1109, 1112 (1993), state the correct interpretation of the
law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore's conviction became final?" Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Because Fiore merely had deviated from the permit's terms, and he did not operate
without a permit, he could not be convicted under the law as properly interpreted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id.
The result in Fiore exemplifies the interaction between retroactivity and due process. The
United State Supreme Court set aside Fiore's conviction because the law as properly interpreted
in Scarponerequired evidence that the defendant did not possess a permit. The effect of the Court's
decision was to harmonize the results in Scarpone with those in Fiore.
One sees the same uniformity rationale discussed in the Florida Supreme Court's retroactivity
analysis in Witt v. State. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Under the Witt doctrine,
uniformity is a justification that may outweigh the interest in finality and allow for the retroactive
application of a later decision. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Thus, even though the
Supreme Court states that the due process principles articulated in Fiore may render a retroactive
analysis unnecessary, the focus on uniformity in individual cases appears in both the Fiore due
process and Witt retroactivity contexts.
80. Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228.
81. Id. at 228-29.
82. See id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) and In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358,364 (1970)). On the state level, this due process principle, that a defendant cannot be convicted
without evidence of the essential elements of the crime, may result in a fundamental error, thus
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Supreme Court found that it had clarified the law as it stood at the time
when Fiore's conviction became final, there was no way that Fiore could
have violated the statute.83 Pennsylvania law permitted a conviction only
when there was evidence that a defendant operated a waste facility without
a permit, not that he merely deviated from the permit's terms.84
Although technically not a retroactivity case, Fiore adds to the
retroactivity analysis by requiring state courts to look back and determine
the applicable law at the time a prior conviction became final.85 As
demonstrated in Fiore,a finding that characterizes a subsequent decision
as a clarification of the law as it existed when the previous conviction
became final mandates that the previous conviction be set aside.86
If, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had found that the later
decision was a change in the law, a retroactivity analysis would have been
necessary.87 This analysis would have been governed by the state law of

requiring a conviction's reversal. See Baldwin v. State, 857 So. 2d 249, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
(noting that "an appellate court will always consider a fundamental error ... which goes to the
foundation of the case or to the merits of the cause of action"). The Second District Court of Appeal
went on to state that "[w]e can think of no error more fundamental than the conviction of a
defendant in the absence of a prima facie showing of the essential elements of the crime charged."
Id. (citing Dydek v. State, 400 So. 2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)).
83. Fiore, 531 U.S. at 228-29. Recall that the State alleged that Fiore had deviated so far
from the permit's terms that his conduct constituted operating a hazardous waste facility without
a permit. Id. at 227.
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85. See supranotes 76- 78 and accompanying text (explaining the procedural posture of Fiore
in which the United States Supreme Court asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to look back to
determine the applicable law at the time Fiore's conviction became final).
86. See Fiore,531 U.S. at 228. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's answer to this question
was dispositive in Fiore. Basically, the question becomes a classification exercise, with the state
court's categorization of the later decision determining whether a defendant will receive the benefit
of retroactivity.
This is especially true in Florida, where minor changes in the law--or, as the Florida Supreme
Court terms them, "evolutionary refinements"--are not applied retroactively. See supranotes 31-32
and accompanying text. If, however, the Florida Supreme Court responds by classifying a later
decision as a clarification of the controlling law at the time a prior conviction became final, then
both Fiore and the federal Due Process Clause require that the conviction be set aside. See supra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
87. See Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 840 (2003) (determining that retroactivity is
inapplicable if a court's first interpretation of a criminal statute is a correct statement of the law at
the time a previous conviction became final).
The United States Supreme Court reasoned that if a subsequent interpretation is a correct
statement of a criminal statute when a prior conviction becomes final, due process and Fiore
require that the conviction be set aside; the State would have convicted a defendant without proving
a necessary element of the offense. Id. at 841. When, however, a later decision is not a correct
statement of the law at the time a prior conviction became final, a state is free to apply its own
retroactivity standards. See id.at 840-41.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

11

FLORIDA
LAW Iss.
REVIEW
Florida Law Review,
Vol. 57,
3 [2005], Art. 3

[Vol. 57

Pennsylvania, not by the federal Due Process Clause.88 Thus, a state's
highest court has the power not only to determine whether a defendant will
receive the benefit of a later decision through retroactivity, but also
whether due process rights will be extended.89 As the next Part
demonstrates, Florida courts determine this important issue on the
arbitrary distinction of whether a post-conviction decision is a
clarification, a jurisprudential upheaval, or an evolutionary refinement.9"
III. THE ILLUSION OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF: AN ANALYSIS OF
FLORIDA'S EVOLUTIONARY REFINEMENT

If the United States Supreme Court has not spoken on a particular
retroactivity issue, state courts may develop their own retroactivity
standards. 9 Specifically, state courts are free to determine when
retroactivity should be applied and when restraint is necessary.92 Florida's
standard allows for the retroactive application of later decisions only when
they are classified as jurisprudential upheavals. 93 Evolutionary
refinements, which are minor changes in the law, are never retroactive.94
The idea behind an evolutionary refinement is that the law evolves over

88. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
89. By characterizing a recent decision as a minor change in the law, a state court may avoid
the Fiore due process implications because Fiore applies only to clarifications. See Bunkley, 538
U.S. at 841. Further, if the applicable state law does not apply minor changes in the law
retroactively, a court's classification of a ruling as a minor change in the law essentially ends a
defendant's appeal process.
90. Id. The United States Supreme Court commented on Fiore and explained that its holding
"entitles Bunkley to a determination as to whether L.B. correctly stated the common pocketknife
exception at the time he was convicted. Ordinarily, the Florida Supreme Court's holding that L.B.
constitutes a change... would be sufficient to dispose of the Fiore question." Id.; see also State
v. Glass, 596 P.2d 10, 13 (Alaska 1979) ("[Retroactivity] will inevitably be somewhat arbitrary.
When the law changes, some get the benefit of the change, others do not."). The Alaska Supreme
Court then explained that "[i]f the court attempts to increase equity between defendants by
increasing the coverage of the new rule, it increases the unfairness to society and law enforcement
officials who in good faith relied on the law as it was when they acted." Id. The Alaska Supreme
Court's comments identify the law enforcement interest that often is lost in the retroactivity
analysis. However, the law enforcement interest hardly seems comparable to a defendant's interest
in having a change in the law applied retroactively, and consequently, having his life sentence set
aside.
91. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
93. Clem v. State, 81 P.3d 521,528 (Nev. 2003) ("The Florida Supreme Court concluded that
L.B. did not apply retroactively because under Florida law only major changes of constitutional law
applied retroactively and L.B. was merely an 'evolutionary refinement' in the law."). See supra
notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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time, culminating at a point along the evolutionary timeline where the
court determines that a change has occurred. 95
If the Florida Supreme Court classifies a decision as an evolutionary
refinement, one might expect to see a progression of case law over time.
When no such progression exists, the check on the Florida Supreme
Court's power is difficult to determine. The United States Supreme Court
may intervene, rule that no change in the law occurred, and set aside a
conviction under Fiore.96 Or, the United States Supreme Court may give
deference to the Florida Supreme Court's decision and allow an illusory
evolutionary refinement, unsupported by precedent, to serve as the basis
for a denial of due process-a denial that allows the State of Florida to
convict an individual of a crime without proving beyond a reasonable
doubt all the required elements.
To gain a better understanding of the due process implications that
arise under the deferential option, the next Part will analyze Florida's
evolutionary refinement doctrine by looking at the case of Bunkley v.
State.97 This discussion will focus on two due process issues that arise
from Florida's limited approach to post-conviction relief. First, I will
argue that Florida's narrow interpretation ofpost-conviction remedies fails
to adequately address an individual's due process claims. Next, I will
argue that the Florida Supreme Court's post-conviction standard results in
nothing more than arbitrary line-drawing. In analyzing the problems
underlying Florida's post-conviction approach, the next Part will try to
unlock the mystery behind the evolutionary refinement to see what
happens when pocketknives no longer are common and instead become
dangerous weapons.
A. Bunkley v. State: A Case Study of Florida's Evolutionary
Refinement Doctrine
No case better exemplifies the due process issues associated with
evolutionary refinement than Bunkley v. State.98 Clyde Timothy Bunkley's
journey through the mystical realm of evolutionary refinement began in
the early morning hours of April 23, 1987. 99 On that date, Bunkley
burglarized a closed and unoccupied Western Sizzlin' restaurant.'° Upon

95. See Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 840-41 (2003).
96. See Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001).
97. 882 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2004).
98. Id. Bunkley apparently was aware of the pocketknife exception at the time he was
arrested. He stated: "I knew that I could legally carry a pocketknife on me, and I knew there was
no way I committed armed burglary." Interview with Clyde Timothy Bunkley, supra note 3.
99. Bunkleyv. State, 833 So. 2d 739, 741 (Fla. 2002), vacated,Bunkleyv. Florida, 538 U.S.
835 (2003).
100. Id. at 740.
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leaving the restaurant, he was apprehended by police who found in his
pocket an unopened pocketknife containing a two and one-half to three
inch blade.' ° ' No evidence suggested that Bunkley used or threatened to
use the pocketknife during the commission of the offense.0 2 However,
because he allegedly was armed with a "dangerous weapon"-namely, the
pocketknife-Bunkley was charged with armed burglary.0 3 Following a
jury trial, he was convicted and given the maximum sentence of life in
prison."'4 In 1989, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Bunkley's
sentence, finalizing his conviction.0 5
The severity of Bunkley's sentence resulted solely from his possesion
of the pocketknife. 0 6 Specifically, Bunkley's fate hinged on whether the
pocketknife was a "weapon" in accordance with Florida Statutes, section
790.001(13), or a "common pocketknife" subject to the statutory
exception. 1 7 Under Florida law, a burglary conviction carries a five-year
sentence, while an armed burglary conviction may result in life
imprisonment.' 8 In 1989, when Bunkley's conviction became final, the
determination of whether a person was in possession of a "weapon" or a
"common pocketknife," was-and arguably still is-a question of fact for
09
the jury. 1

101. Id. at 741. Bunkley apparently was apprehended when he triggered a silent alarm in the
Western Sizzlin' restaurant. Interview with Clyde Timothy Bunkley, supranote 3. Patrol cars were
waiting for Bunkley when he left the building, and he quickly was caught. Id.
102. Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 918 (Pariente, J., dissenting). Bunkley gave testimony that his
"reason for having the knife was to cut roofing materials." Id. at 922 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 891.
104. Id. at 892. On the first day of trial, Bunkley tried to enter into a plea agreement that had
been made a week earlier. Interview with Clyde Timothy Bunkley, supra note 3. The prosecutor,
however, withdrew the agreement moments before trial and pursued the maximum penalty of life
in prison. Id. According to Bunkley, the prosecutor's decision to withdraw the plea resulted from
a smirk Bunkley directed towards the prosecutor. Id.
105. Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 892.
106. See id. at 891-92.
107. See FLA. STAT. § 790.001(13) (2004) (defining "weapon" and creating a "common
pocketknife" exception to the definition); id. § 810.02(2)(b) (defining first degree burglary as a
burglary committed while armed with a dangerous weapon). By excluding the common pocketknife
from the coverage of the statute, the Florida legislature appears not to have intended to punish
citizens for carrying pocketknives.
108. Id. § 810.02(4)(a); id. § 775.082(3)(d).
109. Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 894, 897. The question remains whether the determination of what
constitutes a "dangerous weapon" is a jury question, or whether all pocketknives with blades four
inches or less are per se "common." The Florida Supreme Court appears uncertain about the issue.
In the 2004 Bunkley opinion, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Florida
Supreme Court held that what constituted a "dangerous weapon" in 1989 was a jury question but
that the law had "evolved" by 1997, making a four-inch blade a "common pocketknife" as a matter
of law. Id. In other words, what was a question of fact in 1989 became a question of law in 1997.
Id.; see also L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 373 (Fla. 1997) (Anstead, J., specially concurring)
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Following the Florida Supreme Court's decision in L.B. v. State," the

result in Bunkley with two issues seemingly unresolved appeared
questionable. First, the question remained whether a folded knife with a
blade four inches or less was a "common pocketknife.""' Second, it
remained unclear whether classifying the pocketknife as a weapon was a
question of law or fact." 12 In L.B., the trial court convicted L.B. for
possession of a dangerous weapon after she brought to her school a
pocketknife with a three and three-fourths inch blade." 3 The appellate
court reversed, finding that the "common pocketknife" exception to the
statute was unconstitutionally vague."' Reversing the appellate court, the
Florida Supreme Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague." 5' Further, the court found as a matter of law that L.B.'s three and
three-fourths inch blade plainly fell within the "common pocketknife"
exception to section 790.001(13) of the Florida Statutes." 6 Based on this
finding, the court reversed L.B.'s conviction." 7

(agreeing with the majority that L.B.'s knife was a "common pocketknife" as a matter of law). This
was the "change in the law," the "evolutionary refinement," that enabled the Florida Supreme Court
to avoid the due process implications of Fiore.
Elsewhere in its majority opinion, however, the court stated: "Indeed, this Court in L.B.
recognized the rule that whether a knife is a 'common pocketknife' is a jury question, and stated
that in most cases the answer will be obvious to fact finders." Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 895. If the
Florida Supreme Court in L.B. recognized that whether a knife is a "common pocketknife" is ajury
question, how did the law change from 1989, when it also was a jury question? More importantly,
if there was no change, as the Florida Supreme Court's language suggests, then how is the L.B.
decision not a clarification that, under Fiore,requires Bunkley's conviction to be set aside?
This argument-that there actually was no change in the law in 1997-is further supported by
post-L.B. case law that maintains a jury question standard for determining whether a common
pocketknife is a dangerous weapon.See infra Part III.D.
110. 700 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1997).
111. See infra note 117.
112. See supranote 109.
113. L.B., 700 So. 2d at 371. As in Bunkley, the prosecutor established that the knife in
question was not a common pocketknife, but rather a weapon. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.at 371-72.
116. Id.at 373 (citing 1951-1952 FLA.ATT'Y GEN.BIENNIAL REP., at 722).
117. Id.; see id. (Anstead,J., specially concurring) (agreeing with the "majority that L.B.'s
knife is a 'common pocketknife' as a matter of law"). That L.B. held, as a matter of law, that a knife
with a blade four inches or less is a "common pocketknife" carries interesting implications. Without
fully acknowledging it, the court has established a bright-line test. As the majority explained, "[wie
decline to consider whether a pocketknife with a blade-length in excess of four inches can be
considered a 'common pocketknife."' Id.at 373 n.4. This statement carries the natural inference
that a blade four inches or less always meets the exception. Bear in mind that the only authority
cited for this "new" proposition of law is the 1951 Attorney General opinion. Id. at 373.
Apparently, this opinion gained unbelievably newfound importance sometime between 1989, when
Bunkley's conviction became final, and 1997, when L.B.'s conviction was reversed.
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The Florida Supreme Court's reversal relied exclusively on a 1951
Attorney General opinion that classified a "common pocketknife" as one
containing a blade four inches or less."' Commenting on L.B.'s knife, the
Florida Supreme Court stated that the knife was a "common pocketknife"
under any intended definition of the term." 9 Thus, despite the circuit
court's factual finding that the pocketknife was a weapon, the Florida
Supreme Court reversed, finding as a matter of law that a pocketknife with
a blade four inches or less clearly fell under the statutory exception. 2 '
Although this ruling garnered little interest, it certainly captured
Bunkley's attention, as it appeared to contradict his 1989 conviction, and
he subsequently sought post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850.121 Because his knife had a blade that measured
from two and one-half to three inches in length, Bunkley argued that under
L.B. it was a "common pocketknife."' 22 Accordingly, he claimed that his
conviction for armed burglary should be vacated.'23 The circuit court
dismissed this motion, and the Second District Court of Appeal
affirmed.'24 The Second District, however, did certify to the Florida
Supreme Court the question of whether L.B. should be applied
'
retroactively. 25
26
The Florida Supreme Court held that L.B. did not apply retroactively.1
The court's holding turned on whether L.B. constituted an evolutionary
refinement or a jurisprudential upheaval, 127 as only the latter category of
changes apply retroactively. 128 The court found that L.B. was an
evolutionary refinement that had been in the making for over a hundred
years. 129 Initially, this ruling had two consequences: first, because L.B. was

118. Id.; see supra note 117.
119. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 838 (2003). The rule states that a person found guilty
under Florida law may make a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence if the judgment
"was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State of Florida"
or if"[t]he court did not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment" or "to impose the sentence" or if
"[t]he sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law" or if his "plea was involuntary" or if
"[tihe judgment or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack." FLA. R. CRIm. P. 3.850.
122. Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 836, 838.
123. Id. at 838.
124. Id.
125. Bunkelyv. State, 833 So. 2d 739, 740 (Fla. 2002), vacated,Bunkleyv. Florida, 538 U.S.
835 (2003).
126. Id.at 746.
127. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Florida post-conviction
standards).
128. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Florida post-conviction
standards).
129. Bunkley, 833 So. 2d at 745.
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a change in the law, Fioreand the Due Process Clause apparently did not

control. 3 Second, because it was not a jurisprudential upheaval, L.B.
would not be applied retroactively. 3 '
Following the Florida Supreme Court's ruling, Bunkley successfully

sought a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. 3 ' While
the Court accepted the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation that L.B.
was a change in the law, it did not agree that Fiore was inapplicable.' 3 3
The Court noted that, normally, a determination that L.B. constituted a
change in the law would have been sufficient to dispose of Fiore.'34 Here,
however, the Florida Supreme Court held that L.B. was an evolutionary

refinement.'35 Thus, Fiore may have controlled depending on how far the
law had "evolved" in 1989.136 This unresolved issue resulted in a remand,
with the Court ordering the Florida Supreme Court to address specifically
the following question: What was the status of Florida jurisprudence on
the "common pocketknife" exception to the dangerous weapons statute in
1989? 137
In its 2004 Bunkley opinion, the Florida Supreme Court held that the
law in 1989 made the determination of a pocketknife's status a question

of fact for the jury."' In other words, the law in 1989 had not yet
"evolved" to the point where a knife with a two and three-fourths inch

130. See id. at 744 n.12. The Florida Supreme Court opinion contained a one-sentence analysis
of Fiore's applicability to Bunkley, summarizing that, "Fiore [was] inapplicable to the present
case." Id. Instead of applying Fiore,the court focused exclusively on state retroactivity rules and
quickly concluded that L.B. was a change in the law that would not be applied retroactively. Id. at
744-46. The Florida Supreme Court's disregard for Fiorewas not accepted by the United States
Supreme Court, which declared on appeal that Fioredid control in Bunkley's case. Bunkley v.
Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 840-41 (2003).
131. Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 838.
132. Id. at 836. Bunkley earned the right to have his case heard by the United States Supreme
Court while representing himself on a pro se basis. Interview with Clyde Timothy Bunkley, supra
note 3. Bunkley and his cellmate drafted a petition for certiorari that the United States Supreme
Court ultimately granted. Id.
133. Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 840.
134. Id. at 841.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 841-42. Applying Fioreto Bunkley, the issue then becomes whether the 1997 L.B.
holding was a correct statement of the law at the time Bunkley's conviction became final. Id. If the
L.B. four inch blade standard was the law in 1989, then Bunkley's conviction violated due process
because the State would have failed to prove that Bunkley had a dangerous weapon when he
possessed a pocketknife with a two and one-half to three inch blade. See id.; supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
However, by stating that L.B. was an evolutionary refinement and that the law had not yet
evolved in 1989, the Florida Supreme Court conveniently side-stepped this problem. See infra note
139 and accompanying text.
137. Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 842.
138. Bunkley v. State, 882 So. 2d 890, 897 (Fla. 2004).
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blade was a common pocketknife per se; thus L.B. was a change in the law.
Therefore, Fioredid not apply, and because the jury found that Bunkley's
pocketknife was a dangerous weapon, his conviction for armed burglary
was upheld.13 9
It is difficult to comprehend why the 2004 Bunkley court classified L.B.
as an evolutionary refinement and not as a clarification of the law in 1989
when Bunkley's conviction became final. Most troubling is the fact that
the Florida Supreme Court, relying solely upon the 1951 Attorney General
opinion, reversed L.B.'s conviction.14' Apparently, despite this exclusive
reliance on a 1951 opinion in 1997, the Florida Supreme Court found that
in 1989, the four inch standard had not yet "evolved."' 14' The Attorney
General opinion, however, had existed for thirty-eight years when
Bunkley's conviction became final. 142 It is not clear how the Florida
Supreme Court could find that the 1951 opinion did not apply in 1989, but
by 1997 the opinion somehow had transformed into compelling legal
authority upon which a reversal could be based. 43 This reasoning is
especially puzzling when one notes that, between 1989 and 1997, there
occurred no judicial or legislative development which would have altered
the pocketknife standard."
Bunkley's attempt to cite the 1951 opinion as proof that the law was
the same in 1989 as it was in 1997 met with little success and even less
explanation. 145 The Florida Supreme Court responded to Bunkley's46
assertion by stating that attorney general opinions are not binding law.'

139. Id.
140. L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 373 (Fla. 1997); see Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 837 (referring
to the 1997 L.B. reversal and noting that the Florida Supreme Court's complete analysis was as
follows: "'In 1951, the Attorney General of Florida opined that a pocketknife with a blade of four
inches or less in length was a "common pocketknife." The knife appellant carried, which had a
three and three-quarter inch blade, clearly fell within this range"') (quoting L.B., 700 So. 2d at 373).
The Florida Supreme Court's reasoning was simple: because a 1951 Attorney General opinion said
that a blade four inches or less in length is a "common pocketknife," and L.B.'s blade was three and
three-quarter inches in length, it fell within the common pocketknife exception.
141. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
142. The Attorney General opinion was written in 1951. See supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
144. See Bunkleyv. State, 833 So. 2d 739, 747 (Fla. 2002) (Pariente, J., dissenting), vacated,
Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835 (2003). When one considers case law and statutory activity
between 1989 and 1997, the holding that the four inch standard had not yet evolved in 1989
becomes even more perplexing. No case in that period considered the length of a pocketknife's
blade as determinative of whether it was a dangerous weapon. Further, there were no amendments
to the dangerous weapons statute or policy statements that would have altered the meaning of the
common pocketknife.
145. Bunkley v. State, 882 So. 2d 890, 896-97 (Fla. 2004).
146. Id.
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While the claim that attorney general opinions are not binding authority is
true,147 the Florida Supreme Court did not hesitate to adopt them as such
in L.B.'48 Not only was the 1951 Attorney General opinion treated with the
same weight as binding authority, it was the sole source of precedent cited
by the L.B. court to explain its reversal of the appellate court.149
Further evidence of the Florida Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment
of the 1951 Attorney General opinion 5 ' appears in the court's statement
that the opinion required factfinders to consider "the particular and
peculiar facts surrounding each case."'' When one considers the facts,
Bunkley's pocketknife was even less classifiable as a "weapon" than
152
L.B.'s knife. First, L.B.'s blade measured three and three-fourths inches,
while Bunkley's was only two and one-half to three inches.' Second,
there is no evidence that Bunkley used his knife at any time during the
robbery.' 54 It remained in a folded position in his pocket throughout the
offense.' 55 Finally, the Western Sizzlin' restaurant burglarized by Bunkley
was unoccupied, as the crime occurred around four o'clock in the
morning.'56 In contrast, L.B. brought her knife onto school grounds in the
presence of her fellow students."' Considering these relevant factors,
L.B.'s knife posed a more serious threat than Bunkley's knife. If
Bunkley's pocketknife was more of a "common pocketknife" than L.B.'s,
Bunkley's conviction for armed burglary would violate due process.
Therefore, although the State of Florida convicted him of burglarizing the
restaurant with a dangerous weapon, when considering this factual
comparison of the two cases and the Florida Supreme Court's authoritative
treatment of the 1951 opinion, his pocketknife clearly was exempted from
the statutory definition of a weapon.' 58
Additionally, an important distinction exists between L.B.'s offense
and Bunkley's: L.B. was charged with possession of a dangerous
147. See id. at 897 (citing Leadership Hous., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 336 So. 2d 1239, 1241
(Fla. 4th DCA 1976)).
148. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
150. 1951-1952 FLA. Arr'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP., at 722.
151. See Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 897.
152. L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 373 (Fla. 1997). Butsee Bunldey v. State, 833 So. 2d 739,
741 (Fla. 2002) (stating that L.B.'s pocketknife had a three inch blade), vacated, Bunkley v.
Florida, 538 U.S. 835 (2003). While this discrepancy may just be a careless oversight by the court,
itis interesting that in L.B. the blade was three-fourths of an inch longer, but by the time Bunkley
sought post-conviction relief, it mysteriously had lost three-fourths of an inch.
153. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
155. Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 891.
156. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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weapon,159 whereas Bunkley was charged with armed burglary.'60 In other
words, Bunkley's crime involved an underlying offense.' 6 ' Although both
crimes implicated the same weapons statute,'62 Florida's courts since 1974
have applied different standards to determine whether a pocketknife is a
weapon. 63 Which standard applies depends on whether the crime was a
possession charge or one involving an underlying offense." 6 Where the
crime involves an underlying offense, as it did in Bunkley's case, Florida
courts have required evidence that the pocketknife was used in a
dangerous manner before classifying it as a dangerous weapon.' 65
B. Nixon v. State and Beyond: The Development of the Manner-inWhich-It- Was- Used Test166
The Florida Supreme Court's failure to cite precedent to support its
evolutionary refinement likely stems from its misunderstanding of Florida
courts' interpretations of Florida's weapons statute. Since 1974, when the
potential exists for a penalty enhancement due to a pocketknife's
connection with an underlying offense, Florida's district courts of appeal
have applied the same test.'67 This test focuses on the manner in which the
68
pocketknife was used and not on the length of the pocketknife's blade.
159. See L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. 1997).
160. See Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 893. The court, referring to L.B., recognized that "[u]nlike
Bunkley's crime, there was no underlying offense to which the possession of a weapon was an
enhancement. However, the same definition of'weapon' which excluded a 'common pocketknife'
was at issue." Id.
161. See id.
162. See supranote 107 and accompanying text.
163. See infra note 168.
164. See Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 922 (Pariente, J.,
dissenting) (noting the majority's failure to
distinguish between Bunkley's case and those cases where the common pocketknife was used in
the course of the underlying offense, and questioning whether the issue was therefore properly
submitted to the jury). The standard for possession leaves the weapon determination to the jury,
while the underlying offense standard first requires evidence that the pocketknife was used in a
manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. It
is perfectly logical that the possession standard makes the determination a jury question. In a
possession case, the jury has only one thing to decide: whether the defendant possessed a dangerous
weapon.
165. See infra note 168.
166. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
167. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
168. Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 922 (Pariente, J.,
dissenting). Justice Pariente noted that:
[T]he Third District recognized in reversing the dismissal of a prosecution for
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Nixon, the Legislature's exclusion of
common pocketknives from the definition of weapon does not mean that a
pocketknife cannot be a deadly weapon. Whether an object used as a weapon in
an assault is a deadly weapon is a factual question to be resolved by the finder of
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By failing to acknowledge this line of precedent, the Florida Supreme
Court ignored a critical element required for an armed burglary conviction.
To convict, the State of Florida first must demonstrate that the pocketknife
was used in a dangerous manner.169
For example, in the 1974 case of State v. Nixon, 171 Nixon was charged
171
with aggravated assault after attacking his victim with a pocketknife.
The lower court dismissed the case.172 On appeal, the Third District Court
of Appeal reversed, holding that whether a pocketknife could be classified
as a deadly weapon was a factual determination for the jury. 173 That
determination, the court held, should focus on whether the knife's use was
likely to produce death or great bodily injury. 174 Thus, under Nixon, a jury
determination of whether a pocketknife is175a dangerous weapon focuses on
the manner in which the knife was used.
Twelve years later, in McCoy v. State,176 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal furthered the evolution of case law that focused on the use of the
pocketknife. 177McCoy was charged with aggravated assault after he waved
a pocketknife at his victims.' 78 The trial court instructed the jury that the
pocketknife could be considered a deadly weapon "if it is used or
threatened to be used in a way likely to cause death or great bodily
harm."' 179 Rejecting McCoy's argument that the State failed to offer
evidence that the pocketknife was a deadly weapon, the Fourth District
held on appeal that the manner in which the appellant used the pocketknife

facts at trial and is to be determined upon consideration of its likelihood to
produce death or great bodily injury.
Id.(Pariente, J., dissenting). The manner-in-which-it-was-used test has been adopted in at least one
other jurisdiction. See State v. Hill, 140 N.W.2d 731, 733-34 (Iowa 1966) (reversing a conviction
for carrying a concealed weapon where the state failed to offer proof that the defendant intended
to use as weapons two knives, both of which locked and had three and five-eighths inch blades).
169. See supra note 168.
170. 295 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 3dDCA 1974).
171. Id. at 122.
172. Id.
173. Id.at 122-23.
174. Id. This holding seemingly implies that in cases where there is no evidence that a knife
was used during a burglary or assault, an assailant cannot be guilty of the enhanced offenses of
aggravated assault or armed burglary. This inference reveals itself in future cases. See McCoy v.
State, 789 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing convictions where the State failed to
offer evidence that defendants used the pocketknives in a manner likely to cause death or great
bodily harm); Arroyo v. State, 564 So. 2d 1153, 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
175. Nixon,295 So. 2d at 122.
176. 493 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
at 1095.
177. See id.
178. Id.at 1094.
179. Id.at 1095.
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supported a finding that the knife was a dangerous weapon. 80 Consistent
with the Third District's opinion in Nixon, the Fourth District found that
the determination of whether a pocketknife was a weapon properly turns
on the manner in which the knife was used and not on the length of the
blade. 8 '
In 1990, approximately one year after Bunkley's conviction became
82
final, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided Arroyo v. State.
Arroyo continued to apply the manner-in-which-it-was-used doctrine.183
Arroyo was convicted of attempted armed burglary after he entered the
victims' apartment with an open pocketknife in his hand.' 84 There was no
evidence, however, that Arroyo ever made any threatening gestures with
the pocketknife.8 5 Citing this fact, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed, finding that a pocketknife may be a dangerous weapon within the
meaning of the statute only when there is evidence that the knife was used
in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury. 186 Thus, under
both the Third and Fourth Districts' reasoning, a pocketknife that is never
the commission of a burglary cannot be a dangerous
used during
87
weapon.
The Third and Fourth Districts' holdings are in direct conflict with the
Florida Supreme Court's 2004 Bunkley decision. In Bunkley, the Florida
Supreme Court held that, in 1989, the question of whether a pocketknife
was a weapon was one for the jury.1 8 However, in Arroyo, the Fourth
District reversed the jury's finding because the applicable law required
evidence that the defendant used the pocketknife in a manner likely to
cause death or great bodily injury. 189 Without evidence that the defendant
used the pocketknife in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily
injury, an armed burglary charge should never reach the jury.' 90 Thus, at

180. Id. Again, the court allowed the jury to determine whether a pocketknife was a weapon
by focusing on the manner in which the knife was used.
181. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
182. 564 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
183. Id. at 1154-55.
184. Id. at 1154.
185. Id.
186. Id.at 1155.
187. Compare Arroyo, who had his pocketknife in his hand and in an open position when he
was discovered by his victims, Arroyo, 564 So. 2d at 1154, with Bunkley, who never used or even
removed his pocketknife from his pocket at any point during the commission of the crime. See
supra note 102 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Arroyo had his armed burglary conviction
reversed by the Fourth District, Arroyo, 564 So. 2d at 1155, while Bunkley had his affirmed by the
Second District. Bunkley v. State, 539 So. 2d 477, 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
188. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
190. From a proportionality perspective, this use-analysis requirement is logical. Before
sentencing someone to life in prison, a State should be required to prove that the person in some
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the time Bunkley's conviction became final, in at least one Florida
jurisdiction, the initial determination of whether a pocketknife qualifies as
a weapon was deemed not to be a question for the jury.
Subsequent courts have adhered to the Arroyo standard by requiring
that the pocketknife be used in a dangerous manner. In 2001, the Second
District Court of Appeal, directly following the Fourth District's holding
in Arroyo, decided McCoy v. State.'9' McCoy used a pocketknife to cut a
door screen to gain access into a home. 92 Unlike Bunkley, McCoy had an
open pocketknife in his hand when he was apprehended by his handgunwielding victim.' 93 At trial, the jury convicted McCoy of one count of
armed burglary and one count of burglary of a dwelling. 94 On appeal,
McCoy argued that "he could not be convicted of armed burglary because
he used the common pocketknife only to cut the screen"; he did not
attempt to use it as a weapon. 195 Agreeing with this argument and directly
following Arroyo, the Second District reversed, holding that a defendant
cannot be convicted of armed burglary where the State offers no evidence
that the pocketknife was used as a weapon.' 96
Interestingly, at no point in the 2001 McCoy opinion did the Second
District consider the length of McCoy's knife, nor did it ever discuss the
holding of L.B. In finding that the defendant's conviction for armed
burglary could not stand, the McCoy court relied strictly upon the mannerin-which-it-was-used test of Arroyo. 97 Thus, Florida's courts have
consistently held that where there is no evidence of the pocketknife's use,

way intended to harm another person. Life sentences are reserved for the most heinous of crimes,
such as murder, armed robbery, and rape. Where someone commits a simple burglary while having
a pocketknife in his pocket, the punishment of life in prison hardly could be said to fit the crime.
Further, this use requirement promotes uniformity and fairness in individual cases, which the
Florida Supreme Court seems concerned within its jurisprudential upheaval analysis. See supranote
33 and accompanying text. In determining whether a ruling is a jurisprudential upheaval, the court
notes that finality should control unless principles of fairness and uniformity in individual cases
outweigh the finality interest. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. By requiring evidence of
use, the'result in Bunkley likely would have mirrored the result in Arroyo. Thus, regardless of
whether a defendant committed the burglary within the jurisdiction of the Second District Court
of Appeal or the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the resulting sentences would be similar, instead
of markedly different. See supra notes 5, 10 and accompanying text.
191. 789 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).
192. Id at 490.
193. Id.
194. Id. at489.
195. Id. at 490.
196. Id.The district court then noted that when a common pocketknife is involved, "the State
must produce some evidence that the defendant used the pocketknife as a 'dangerous weapon' for
purposes of section 810.02(2)(b) before the jury may decide that the defendant committed armed
burglary." Id.The court found that the State did not present such evidence in this case. Id.
197. Id.
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there can be no armed burglary conviction. The Florida Supreme Court,
however; ignored this line of cases and proceeded down a different path.
C. Ortiz v. State: The Bunkley Court's Rejection of the Manner-inWhich-It- Was- Used Test
In its 2004 Bunkley opinion, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the
notion that the manner-in-which-it-was-used test was the applicable law
in 1989, further blurring the jurisprudential distinction between the
common pocketknife and the dangerous weapon.19 8 To support its rejection
of the manner-in-which-it-was-used test, the Bunkley court cited to the
Second District case of State v. Ortiz.99 Ortiz possessed a knife containing
a four-inch blade and subsequently was charged with possession of a
concealed weapon.2"' The trial court dismissed the case, finding that the
knife fell within the common pocketknife exception to the weapons
statute.2"' The Second District reversed, holding that whether a pocketknife
fits within the common pocketknife exception is a factual determination
for the jury.20 2
In citing Ortiz and finding that in 1989 the jury would be asked to
determine whether a pocketknife was a weapon, the Florida Supreme
Court failed to acknowledge a critical distinction: Ortiz and its progeny all
dealt with possession of a dangerous weapon, while Bunkley and the
"manner-in-which-it-was-used" line of cases involved underlying
offenses.20 3 In responding to the United States Supreme Court's question
regarding the status of the relevant law in 1989, the Florida Supreme Court
should have analyzed cases involving conduct similar to Bunkley's
crime-crimes which involve an underlying offense, such as armed
burglary, and not crimes which are factually and legally distinct. Had the

198. Bunkley v. State, 882 So. 2d 890, 896 (Fla. 2004).
199. Id. at 894-95 (citing State v. Ortiz, 504 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)).
200. Ortiz, 504 So. 2d at 40.
201. Id.
202. Id.InBunkley, the Florida Supreme Court was quick to recognize that Ortiz only reversed
a motion to dismiss. See Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 894. It noted, however, that subsequent cases
continued to follow this "jury determination" rule. Id. Interestingly, one of the cases cited by the
court was post-L.B., which begs the question: If, in 1989, the question of whether a pocketknife was
a weapon was a jury determination, and L.B. changed the law, how could the question of what is
a weapon remain ajury determination in 2003? If the law did not change, and the Florida Supreme
Court suggests that it did not, then L.B. must have been a clarification of the law as it stood in 1989.
203. See Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 893. Justice Pariente adamantly argued this distinction in her
dissent. She specifically questioned the majority's reliance on post-L.B. precedent, citing Ortiz and
stating that "the majority fail[ed] to distinguish cases in which the common pocketknife was not
used in the course of another offense from cases where, depending on the manner of use, even a
common pocketknife could become a weapon and the issue was therefore properly submitted to the
jury." Id. at 922 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
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Florida Supreme Court followed this approach, it would have discovered
that in 1989, absent any evidence that a defendant used a pocketknife in a
manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury, a charge of armed
burglary could never reach the jury box.2 °4
D. Beyond L.B. v. State: The Viability of the Ortiz Jury
Question Standard
One must carefully consider the question the United States Supreme
Court remanded to the Florida Supreme Court: Was the law as announced
in L.B. the same law that was in effect in 1989?" °5 Because the Florida
Supreme Court responded to this question by stating that L.B. marked a
change in the law, one might expect to see Florida's courts applying the
four inch standard to the pocketknife exception. A review of post-L.B.
decisions that interpret the dangerous weapons statute, however, reveals
that Florida's courts still apply the 1989 standard, which left the
determination to a jury.2"6
Given the Florida Supreme Court's reliance on cases such as Baldwin
0 7 this continued adherence to the jury question standard is not
v. State,"
surprising. In Baldwin, the defendant was convicted for carrying a
concealed weapon and for possession of a firearm by a violent criminal. 0 8
On appeal, the Second District reversed, finding that the State failed to
prove that Baldwin possessed a concealed weapon.209
In reversing Baldwin's conviction, the Second District relied on
Ortiz.2"' Namely, the court relied on the Ortiz court's holding that whether
a knife qualified as a common pocketknife was a question of fact that
should be resolved by a jury.2 11 By supporting its decision with Ortiz, the
Second District followed the 1989 jury determination standard,
demonstrating that, although L.B. claimed to be a change from this
approach, that standard remained alive and well in 2003.

204. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. This manner-of-use test appears to be
the controlling law in Florida today. See J.M. v. State, 872 So. 2d 985, 986-87 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
(upholding a conviction of aggravated assault where the evidence showed that the defendant used
the knife in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily injury).
205. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
206. See Bunkley, 882 So. 2d at 894 ("While Ortiz was decided in the context of a motion to
dismiss, the Second District has repeatedly affirmed that the Ortiz decision rested on the rule that
'whether the knife was a common pocketknife was a question of fact that must be resolved by a
jury."') (quoting Baldwin v. State, 857 So. 2d 249, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)).
207. 857 So. 2d 249.
208. Id. at 250. Appellant also was convicted of driving with a suspended license and leaving
the scene of a crash. Id.
209. Id. at 250-51.
210. Id. at 252.
211. Id.
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With courts still applying the jury question standard, it is difficult to
see how L.B. constituted an evolutionary refinement in the law instead of
a clarification. This evolutionary refinement appears even more elusive
when one considers the Florida Supreme Court's sole authority for the
evolution-a 1951 Attorney General opinion.2" 2 This source was wholly
ignored in 1989, but by 1997 it was significant enough to become binding
authority upon which to base a reversal." 3
The absence of a true evolution of the common pocketknife exception
suggests that Florida's evolutionary refinement standard results in mere
arbitrary line-drawing instead of providing adequate means to address a
prisoner's post-conviction relief claims. By holding that a recent decision
was an evolutionary refinement, the Florida Supreme Court was able to
avoid the due process implications of Fiorebecause the rule developed in
Fiore applies only to clarifications.214 Further, because the Florida
Supreme Court does not apply evolutionary refinements retroactively, the
seemingly arbitrary characterization of a post-conviction decision as an
evolutionary refinement essentially ends a defendant's appeal process,
even when no such evolution appears to exist.
Additional support for the argument that Florida's classification
approach results in arbitrary line-drawing exists by considering that
Bunkley easily could have been classified as a Coker-style jurisprudential
upheaval.2" 5 Under the Coker standard, a change of law that proscribes a
state from regulating certain conduct or imposing certain penalties must
be applied retroactively.21 6 If the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning is
correct, L.B. prohibited Florida's courts from imposing penalties on a
citizen caught with an unopened common pocketknife with a blade of four
inches or less. In other words, Florida's courts cannot find these types of
pocketknives-never used during the commission of an offense-to be
dangerous weapons. Thus, any conviction which results in an enhanced
punishment for carrying pocketknives should be set aside.217

212. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
213. Id.
214. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing the Fiore standard and how
changes in the law are not governed by Fiore).
215. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (describing the Coker ruling that
proscribed the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant convicted of rape).
216. See supra notes 36-38.
217. Because the dangerous weapons statute applies to such a broad range of offenses, a
jurisprudential upheaval finding may have resulted in the burdening of "the judicial machinery"
that the Florida Supreme Court seems unwilling to accept. See Arroyo v. State, 564 So. 2d 1153,
1154 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (applying Chapter 790's dangerous weapons statute to an armed burglary
case, and citing Hartman v. State, 403 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), for holding that,
where a dangerous weapons definition has reasonable application elsewhere, it should not be
limited only to Chapter 790); supra note 66 and accompanying text (citing judicial burdening to
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One source of the arbitrariness problem connected with evolutionary
refinement is the Florida Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of
post-conviction relief. Under the Florida approach, courts review a postconviction appeal by focusing on the retroactive application of new laws,
rather than on the due process implications articulated in Fiore."8 The
Florida Supreme Court's reluctance both to apply Fiore and to address
Bunkley's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims demonstrated this
limited review. Only after the United States Supreme Court ordered the
Florida Supreme Court to apply Fiore did it consider the due process
implications." 9
This analysis, however, was a sloppy one at best. By classifying L.B.
as a change in the law, the Florida Supreme Court, in one fell swoop,
concluded its own post-conviction review process, which focused on
retroactivity, and simultaneously disposed of the Fioreinquiry. ° Thus, in
the time it takes to unfold a pocketknife, an arbitrary finding of an
evolutionary refinement effectively precludes any adequate review of an
appellant's post-conviction due process claims.
IV. REMEDYING THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE EVOLUTIONARY
REFINEMENT DOCTRINE

As demonstrated in Bunkley, once the Florida Supreme Court classifies
a post-conviction decision as an evolutionary refinement, retroactivity is
" ' In addition, due process relief is unlikely because a postdenied.22
conviction appellant's only hope is a finding, based on Fiore, that an
alleged evolutionary refinement really was a clarification.222 Although
Fiore will not cause a court to apply a post-conviction decision
retroactively, it will result in the conviction being set aside. 223 The hurdle,
however, is quite high. A post-conviction appellant first must receive a
granted writ of certiorari and then convince the United States Supreme
Court that the Florida Supreme Court has misinterpreted its own
precedent-that what it characterized as an evolutionary refinement really
was a clarification of the law at the time a previous conviction became
final.2 24

justify why retroactive application should outweigh finality only in the rarest of circumstances).
218. See supra note 34.
219. See supranotes 136-37 and accompanying text.
220. See supranote 138 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
224. See Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 844 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's remand that sought an explanation of how far the
common pocketknife exception had evolved in 1989. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He took a
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A. FederalIntervention: Placinga Check on the Arbitrary
EvolutionaryRefinement
Although hardly profound, one solution to the arbitrary line-drawing
that results from evolutionary refinement is for the United States Supreme
Court to require an actual and demonstrable evolution of case law.
Although this approach would require the Court to exercise greater
scrutiny of Florida Supreme Court decisions, it would increase the
likelihood that an appellant's due process rights have not been denied. The
Florida Supreme Court would not be permitted to classify a decision as an
evolutionary refinement without first demonstrating a historical evolution
backed by precedent. Where the development of case law exists, a finding
that a post-conviction decision was a change in the law instead of a Fiore
clarification would be justified. Where, however, no evolution of case law
exists, the United States Supreme Court should refuse to accept the finding
that a change in the law occurred, and it should rule that a later decision
was a clarification.225
Federal courts may exercise this greater scrutiny of Florida's
evolutionary refinement doctrine by expanding federal habeas
protection. 226 Habeas doctrine grants federal courts the power to serve as

particularly strong federalist approach, noting that "[t]his rebuke to the state court violates the wellestablished rule that this Court will not 'require state courts to reconsider cases to clarify the
grounds of their decisions."' See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983)). Chief Justice Rehnquist proceeded to criticize the Court's decision,
claiming that "it also unjustifiably interfere[d] with States' interest in finality." Id.(Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
The Chief Justice's dissent makes a strong case for keeping the federal judiciary out of state
criminal law, a traditional state sphere of power. However, when an appellant's central concern is
due process, this deferential approach seems less appealing. Under the Chief Justice's view, a state
supreme court ruling that interprets a state criminal law decision as a change in the law should
receive the utmost deference, with the Supreme Court accepting the state court's decision at face
value. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This implies that when Florida classifies a ruling as an
evolutionary refinement, even when no such evolution actually exists, the appellant is left with no
recourse. Adopting this view would place the determination of whether Fiore and due process
rights apply solely in the hands of the Florida Supreme Court and not the highest court in the land.
225. This increasing scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court may go against the federalist
principle of deference to state courts in interpreting their criminal statutes. See supra note 224.
However, reaching just results and protecting an individual's due process rights arguably should
outweigh these federalist considerations.
226. See Hutton,supra note 25, at 429 (citing Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Linkletter
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), in which he criticizes the majority's finding that states' interests
in keeping people incarcerated outweigh those individuals' rights to relief from unconstitutional
convictions). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731(1991) (arguing that a federal
check on the state courts is justified to ensure fairness of process).
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a buffer between the states and the people and to act as "guardians of the
people's federal rights."22' 7 In the past, the United States Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of habeas relief to address inadequacies in the
states' ability to adjudicate federal constitutional claims. 28 Because the
Florida Supreme Court has restricted post-conviction remedies to a mere
review of decisions after a change in the law instead of considering an
individual's due process claims, it may be time for the United States
Supreme Court to re-establish its guardian role of protecting an
individual's constitutional rights.
Given the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to adopt such an
active role in reviewing state supreme court decisions,229 this reaffirmation
is unlikely to materialize. Since Teague v. Lane,23° the United States
Supreme Court has retreated from the expansion of habeas relief.231 Under
Teague, an individual seeking collateral relief can receive the retroactive
application of a later decision only if the case falls within two narrow
exceptions. 21 2 The first exception resembles the Coker-stylejurisprudential
upheaval adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Witt v. State.233 It
allows for retroactivity when a later decision places certain kinds of
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
of the state.234 The second exception grants retroactive relief if such action

227. Hutton, supranote 25, at 435-36 (quoting Justice Brennan in Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1,
10 (1984)). Indeed, the federal judiciary may be the best guarantor of a post-conviction appellant's
due process rights. State judges, like those on the Florida Supreme Court, are held accountable
through the election process. See id. at 445-46. This accountability may make it more difficult for
them to grant relief to a convicted individual, as they may come across as soft on crime. See id.
(discussing this accountability issue in the context of post-conviction relief).
at 433-34. Hutton further describes the United States Supreme Court's retreat from
228. See id.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and its unwillingness to broadly construe federal habeas relief
Hutton, supra note 25, at 434-35. She also astutely points out that, when state post-conviction
remedies are at issue, the federalist principles disappear, leaving only the State's interest of finality
weighed against the protection of an individual's rights. Id. at 436-37. This liberalization of habeas
safeguards would not be without cost. For example, an increased role of the federal courts may
upset the finality of judgments, increase friction between state and federal courts, and expend
scarce judicial resources. See supra note 224; notes 63-66 and accompanying text. However, an
incarceration that violates due process cannot be justified on federalist and judicial economy
principles. As Justice Brennan stated in Fay: "Surely no fair-minded person will contend that those
who have been deprived of their liberty without due process of law ought nevertheless to languish
in prison." Hutton, supra note 25, at 435 (quoting 372 U.S. at 441).
229. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44
OHIO ST. L.J. 367,387-90 (1983) (discussing the Court's inclination to restrict the types of claims
available for habeas review).
230. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
231. Hutton, supra note 25, at 434-35.
232. Teague, 489 U.S. at310-11.
233. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
234. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
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is necessary to observe "those procedures that . . . are 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. , 235 Beyond these two narrow exceptions, new
rules generally are not applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review.236
B. Beyond Changes in the Law: Expanding the Purposeof PostConvictionRelief
Considering the laissez-faire approach to habeas articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane,23 7 the solution to
problems associated with Florida's post-conviction relief ultimately may
have to come from the Florida Supreme Court itself. The court may be
able to remedy the undermining of due process by expanding the purpose
of post-conviction relief. Currently, under the Witt doctrine, the main
purpose of post-conviction relief in Florida is to address changes in the law
and to determine whether they will be applied retroactively. 23 8 While this
undoubtedly is a proper aspect of post-conviction jurisprudence, this
limited review is too narrow in scope to fully address all of a postconviction appellant's claims.
As demonstrated in Bunkley v. State, due process implications arise
from the Florida Supreme Court's initial interpretation of a criminal
statute, and these concerns must be addressed. By augmenting the scope
of its post-conviction proceedings to include an emphasis on due process
claims, the Florida Supreme Court could properly focus on these issues.
Not only would such an expansion alleviate the concern of affording
deference to state courts, articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Bunkley
v. Florida,239 but it also would give a post-conviction appellant a definite
forum in which to raise his constitutional claims. Thus, he would not have
to hope for a granted petition for federal habeas to obtain relief.
V. CONCLUSION

Although states are free to adopt their own standards for postconviction relief, a state's approach might fail to adequately address an
individual's due process claims. Such is the case in Florida. By merely

235. Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
236. Id. at 310-11.
237. 489 U.S. 288.
238. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. See generally 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S.
LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 7.1 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing

the types of state post-conviction standards that may inadequately address an individual's right to
due process).
239. See supra note 224.
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characterizing a later decision as an evolutionary refinement, the Florida
Supreme Court's post-conviction analysis avoids the due process
implications that arise with retroactivity. This may not be controversial if
the Florida Supreme Court is able to support its finding with an actual
evolution of case law. Where, however, there is no such evolution, there
can be no evolutionary refinement. To permit such a continuance is to
allow Florida's evolutionary refinement doctrine to serve as the basis for
undue process.
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